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An analytical framework is developed to study the repercussions between endogenous capital- 
and labor-saving technical change and population aging. Following an intuition often 
attributed to Hicks (1932), I ask whether and how population aging affects the relative 
scarcity of factors of production, relative factor prices, and the direction of induced technical 
change. Aging is equivalent to an increase in the old-age dependency ratio of an OLG-
economy with two-period lived individuals. In this framework aging increases the relative 
scarcity of labor with respect to capital. Therefore, there will be more labor- and less capital-
saving technical change. Unless there are contemporaneous knowledge spillovers across 
innovating firms technical change induced by a small increase in the old-age dependency ratio 
has no first-order effect on current GDP. The presence of capital-saving technical change is 
shown to imply that the economy's steady-state growth rate is independent of its age structure. 
JEL-Code: D91, D92, O33, O41. 
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Population aging, i.e., the process by which older individuals become a proportion-
ally larger fraction of the total population, is an enduring phenomenon in many of
today's developed and developing countries. Table 1 shows actual data and pre-
dictions of the United Nations concerning the old-age dependency ratio for several
countries and regions.1 Roughly speaking, between 2005 and 2050 this ratio is es-
timated to double in Europe and Northern America. In China, India, and Japan
its predicted increase is even more pronounced. Such drastic demographic develop-
ments have become a severe burden for these economies. To meet this challenge it
is essential to understand the economic consequences of population aging.
This paper studies the eect of population aging on innovation incentives and eco-
nomic growth in an environment where the direction of technical change is endoge-
nous, i.e., rms may undertake innovation investments that generate capital- or
labor-saving technical change. My starting point is Hicks' contention according to
which innovation incentives depend on relative factor prices reecting the relative
relative scarcity of these factors. In his book, The Theory of Wages, he asserts that
\A change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a
spur to invention, and to invention of a particular kind - directed to
economizing the use of a factor which has become relatively expensive.
..." (Hicks (1932), p. 124)
Since the process of population aging tends to reduce the labor force, the factor
labor becomes, ceteris paribus, scarcer relative to the factor capital. Accordingly,
its relative price may increase and labor-saving innovations become more protable.
For the same reason, the incentive to direct innovation investments towards capital-
saving innovations declines. Hence, if Hicks' contention applies, population aging
may aect the direction of technical change.
However, from the perspective of a dynamic general equilibrium, the validity of
Hicks' contention does not only hinge on the evolution of the labor force. It also
depends on the ability and the willingness of an aging population to save and to
accumulate capital. Fewer workers and/or a declining real rate of return may re-
duce aggregate savings. Hence, to understand the eect of population aging on the
1These numbers appear in United Nations (2008) as the `medium variant' prediction. The old-
age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 65 or over to the population aged 15-64.
This ratio is stated as the number of dependants per 100 persons of working age (15-64).
1Table 1: Old-Age Dependency Ratios in Selected Countries and Regions.
Year Europe Northern China India Japan
America
2005 23 19 11 7 30
2050 47 36 38 20 74
direction of technical change one has to disentangle the intricate relationship be-
tween partial and general equilibrium eects. It is a primary purpose of the present
paper to accomplish this. Building on the insights of my analysis, I inquire into the
implications of population aging for steady-state and transitional growth.
To address these questions, I devise a new neoclassical growth model with endoge-
nous capital- and labor-saving technical change. The model is set up in discrete
time with two-period lived overlapping generations as in Allais (1947), Samuelson
(1958), or Diamond (1965). This framework allows for a straightforward represen-
tation of population aging as an increase in the old-age dependency ratio. Both, a
decline in the growth rate of the labor force and/or an increase in life expectancy
parameterized by a probability to live through the period of old age, augment this
ratio.
The production side of the economy under scrutiny is neoclassical since it maintains
the assumptions of perfect competition, of an aggregate production function with
constant returns to scale and positive and diminishing marginal products, and of
capital accumulation. It features endogenous growth since economic growth results
from innovation investments undertaken by prot-maximizing rms. To allow for
innovation investments in capital- and labor-saving technical change, I introduce two
intermediate-good sectors, one producing a capital-intensive intermediate, the other
a labor-intensive intermediate. Innovation investments increase the productivity of
capital and labor at the level of these intermediate-good rms. Moreover, they feed
into aggregate productivity indicators that evolve cumulatively, i.e., in a way often
referred to as `standing on the shoulders of giants'.
In this framework, I derive the following major results. First, I establish the existence
of a unique steady state with nite state variables. The properties of this steady state
are consistent with Kaldor's famous facts (Kaldor (1961)). There is no capital-saving
2technical progress in the steady-state. Per-capita variables such as consumption,
savings, or the real wage grow at the (net) growth rate of labor-saving technical
knowledge.2 More importantly, this steady-state growth rate is pinned down by the
production side of the economy alone. Parameter changes reecting an improvement
in the quality of the institutional framework or in the eciency of the innovation
technology increase the steady-state growth rate. However, population aging has no
eect on the steady-state growth rate.
Second, I prove that the steady state is locally stable and study the economic con-
sequences of demographic change on transitional dynamics. Although population
aging has no steady-state growth eect, it aects the economy's growth rate along
the transition. Arguably, with a period representing approximately 30 years, these
eects are quite relevant for those generations living through the transition. Taking
a steady state as the starting point, I capture population aging by a once and for
all decline in the growth rate of the labor force and/or by a once and for all increase
in life expectancy. In both cases, the economy leaves its steady state and embarks
on a trajectory with an increased speed of capital deepening, i.e., labor becomes
scarcer relative to capital. In line with Hicks' contention, there is more labor- and
less capital-saving technical change.
Third, I study the eect of population aging on the evolution of gross domestic
product (GDP) both in absolute and per-capita terms. I nd that a decline in
the growth rate of the labor force may reduce GDP for two reasons. First, if the
generation with fewer osprings rationally anticipates a lower rate of return, it may
save less. Second, a declining work force reduces aggregate output by more than
aggregate innovation investments. For reasonable parameter values, these eects
also imply a decline of per-capita GDP in response to population aging. However,
there is no rst-order eect of induced technical change on GDP unless I allow
for contemporaneous knowledge spillovers as in Romer (1986). This conrms in a
full-edged endogenous growth model an intuition derived in Acemoglu (2007) and
Acemoglu (2009) according to which the technology choice in a competitive economy
maximizes GDP given factor endowments unless there is an externality.
My analysis builds on and contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it
makes a contribution to the theoretical literature on the causal eect of demographic
trends on physical capital accumulation and economic performance in models with
overlapping generations. Hitherto, this literature has not looked at the implications
2The ndings concerning steady-state growth rates are also in line with the so-called Steady-
State Growth Theorem of Uzawa (1961). See Irmen (2009) for a discussion of the relationship
between the production side of the economy studied here and Uzawa's theorem.
3of demographic change on the direction of technical change. Recent contributions
include d'Albis (2007) and Futagami and Nakajima (2001).3
These papers base their analysis on the continuous time OLG model with nite
lifetime of Cass and Yaari (1967) and Tobin (1967). While d'Albis (2007) studies
the monotonic relationship between the population growth rate and the steady-state
capital intensity in an economy without technical change, the analysis in Futagami
and Nakajima (2001) adds endogenous growth following Romer (1986). In fact,
Futagami and Nakajima nd a positive eect of longevity on the steady-state growth
rate of the economy. Here, increasing longevity is equivalent to an increase in the
nite and deterministic individual lifespan. This result relies i) on the complex
relationship between the economy's aggregate savings rate and its steady-state age
distribution, and ii) on the AK-type aggregate production function. Since a longer
lifespan increases the economy's savings rate, it also accelerates steady-state growth.
Contrary to this result, my analysis suggests that the link between aging and the
aggregate savings rate leaves the steady-state growth rate unaected once one allows
for capital-saving technical change.
Second, the present paper extends and complements the literature on endogenous
economic growth in competitive economies that started with Bester and Petrakis
(2003), Hellwig and Irmen (2001), and Irmen (2005).4 These contributions allow
for endogenous economic growth through innovation investments that increase the
productivity of labor. However, the competitive framework is also well suited for
the analysis of capital- versus labor-saving technical change in an aging economy.
Its neoclassical properties facilitate the identication of the role of both types of
endogenous technical change relative to the neoclassical growth model of Solow
(1956) and Swan (1956) with or without exogenous labor-saving technical change.
Third, my model makes a contribution to the theory of endogenous economic growth
that also explains the direction of technical change.5 The focus of this literature
is on the interaction between changing factor endowments and the incentives to
engage in innovation investments that may increase the productivity of these factors
3There is also a theoretical literature concerned with the role of demographic change for human
capital accumulation and economic performance in OLG models. Recent contributions include
de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002), Heijdra and Romp
(2009), and Ludwig and Vogel (2009).
4An alternative way to model endogenous economic growth in a competitive framework has
been proposed by Boldrin and Levine (1999), and Boldrin and Levine (2008).
5This theory has its roots in the so-called `induced innovations' literature of the 1960s. It is
comprehensively surveyed in Acemoglu (2003a). Funk (2002) provides a critique of this literature
and a microfoundation in a perfectly competitive setup.
4dierently. This literature has been initiated by the works of Daron Acemoglu (see,
e.g., Acemoglu (1998), Acemoglu (2002), Acemoglu (2003b), Acemoglu (2007), and
Acemoglu (2009)).6 Similar to these studies, the direction of technical change in my
model is determined by innovation decisions of intermediate-good rms. However,
to allow for a balanced growth path with population growth I dispense with the scale
eect both at the level of intermediate-good rms and at the level of the innovation
technology.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the model.
Section 3 studies the intertemporal general equilibrium and establishes the existence
and the stability properties of the steady state. In Section 4, I consider increases
in the old-age dependency ratio due to a decline in the labor force growth rate.
The focus of my analysis is on the implications for the evolution of GDP and for
the direction of technical change. Section 5 extends the analysis in two directions.
First, following Romer (1986), I allow for contemporaneous knowledge spillovers
across innovating rms in Section 5.1. Second, I study the case where the old-
age dependency ratio increases because of a higher life expectancy in Section 5.2.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Details on the phase
diagrams are given in Appendix B. Appendix C presents a calibration exercise. It
shows that the model is consistent with the recent growth experience of today's
industrialized countries.
2 The Basic Model
The economy has a household sector, a nal-good sector, and two intermediate-
good sectors in an innite sequence of periods t = 1;2;:::;1. The household sector
comprises two-period lived individuals. There are ve objects of exchange. The
manufactured nal good can be consumed or invested. If invested it may either be-
come future capital or serve as an input in current innovation activity undertaken by
intermediate-good rms. Intermediate-good rms produce one of two types of inter-
mediates and sell it to the nal-good sector. The production of the labor-intensive
intermediate good uses labor as the sole input, the only input in the production
of the capital-intensive intermediate good is capital. Intermediate-good rms either
belong to the sector that produces the labor- or the capital-intensive intermediate.
Accordingly, I shall refer to the labor- and the capital-intensive intermediate-good
sector. Labor- and capital-saving technical change is the result of innovation invest-
ments undertaken by intermediate-good rms of the respective sector. Households
6Other important studies on this topic include Lloyd-Ellis (1999), Kiley (1999), Galor and Moav
(2000), or Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000).
5supply labor and capital to the intermediate-good sectors. Labor is \owned" by the
young, the old own the capital stock. Capital is the only asset in the economy.7
Each period has markets for all ve objects of exchange. The nal good serves as
num eraire.
2.1 Households
The two-period lived individuals work and save when young, retire when old, and
consume during both periods of their life. At t, there are Lt young and Lt 1 old
individuals. Individual labor supply when young is exogenous and normalized to
one. I denote  > ( 1) the exogenous growth rate of the labor force. Population
aging in the sense of an increasing old-age dependency ratio dened as Lt 1=Lt
occurs whenever  declines between two adjacent periods.
Preferences of a member of cohort t are homothetic and dened over the level of
consumption when young and old, c
y
t and co










where u : R++ ! R is a per-period utility function. It is C2 and satises u0(c) >
0 > u00(c) for all c > 0 as well as limc!0 u0(c) = 1. To ensure the uniqueness of the
equilibrium, I assume that preferences are such that the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is greater or equal to unity. Moreover,  2 (0;1) is the discount factor.




t+1 = st Rt+1, where st denotes savings, wt > 0 the real wage at t, and Rt+1 > 0
the real rental rate of capital between t and t+1, expected under perfect foresight.



















in conjunction with the two budget constraints. Given our assumptions on pref-
erences, this plan involves a continuous and partially dierentiable function that
7My setup is mute on the question as to who owns the innitely-lived rms in the economy.
Moreover, I consider competitive equilibria where per-period prots are zero such that the expected
present discounted value of dividends associated with any ownership share is zero, too. It is well
known that these considerations are not sucient to exclude equilibria with bubbles since the
number of potential traders is innite in the OLG-framework (Tirole (1985)). In what follows, I
disregard this possibility and focus on equilibria without bubbles.
6relates savings to current income, the expected rental rate of capital, and the dis-
count factor
st = s(Rt+1;)wt; (2.3)
where s(Rt+1;) 2 (0;1) is the marginal propensity to save out of wage income with
partial derivatives sR (Rt+1;)  0 and s (Rt+1;) > 0.
2.2 The Final-Good Sector
The nal-good sector produces with a production function F : R2
++ ! R++
Yt = F (YK;t;YL;t); (2.4)
where Yt is aggregate output in t, YK;t is the aggregate amount of the capital-
intensive intermediate input used in t, and YL;t denotes the aggregate amount of the
labor-intensive intermediate input. The function F is C2 with F1 > 0 > F11 and
F2 > 0 > F22. Moreover, it exhibits constant-returns-to-scale with respect to both
inputs. To include, e.g., the CES production function, I make no assumptions on
the limits of the function F and its derivatives for YK ! 0, YL ! 0, YK ! 1, and
YL ! 1.
Under these assumptions, I may study the competitive behavior of the nal-good
sector in terms of a single representative rm. In units of the nal good of period t
as num eraire the prot in t of the nal-good sector is
Yt   pK;tYK;t   pL;tYL;t; (2.5)
where pj;t, j = K;L, is the price of the respective intermediate.
The nal-good sector takes the sequence fpK;t;pL;tg
1
t=1 of factor prices as given
and maximizes the sum of the present discounted values of prots in all periods.
Since it simply buys both intermediates in each period, its maximization problem
is equivalent to a series of one-period maximization problems. Let t denote the





Then, the production function in intensive form is F (t;1)  f (t). The respective
prot-maximizing rst-order conditions for t = 1;2;::: are
YK;t : pK;t = f
0 (t); (2.7)
YL;t : pL;t = f (t)   tf
0 (t): (2.8)
72.3 The Intermediate-Good Sector
There are two dierent sets of intermediate-good rms, each represented by the set
R+ of nonnegative real numbers with Lebesgue measure. Intermediate-good rms
either belong to the labor- or to the capital-intensive intermediate-good sector.
2.3.1 Technology
At any date t, all rms of a sector have access to the same sector-specic technology
with production function
yl;t = minf1;atltg and yk;t = minf1;btktg; (2.9)
where yl;t and yk;t is output, 1 a capacity limit,8 at and bt denote a rm's labor and
capital productivity in period t, lt and kt is the labor and the capital input. While
labor, lt, is hired at t, capital, kt, must be installed in t   1. The rms' respective
labor and capital productivity is equal to
at = At 1(1    + q
A
t ) and bt = Bt 1(1    + q
B
t ); (2.10)
here At 1 and Bt 1 denote aggregate indicators of the level of technological knowl-
edge to which innovating rms in period t have access for free. Naturally,  2 (0;1)
is the rate of depreciation of technological knowledge in both sectors, and qA
t and
qB
t are indicators of (gross) productivity growth at the rm level. Without loss of
generality, capital fully depreciates after one period.
To achieve a productivity growth rate q
j
t > 0, j = A;B, a rm must invest i(q
j
t)
units of the nal good in period t. The function i : R++ ! R++ is the same for
both sectors, time invariant, C2, increasing and strictly convex. Hence, higher rates
of productivity growth require ever larger innovation investments. Moreover, with





















If a rm innovates, the assumption is that an innovation in period t is proprietary
knowledge of the rm only in t, i.e., in the period when it is made. Subsequently, the
8The analysis is easily generalized to allow for an endogenous capacity choice requiring addi-
tional capacity investments, with investment outlays being a strictly convex function of capacity. In
such a setting prot-maximizing behavior implies that a larger innovation investment is accompa-
nied by a larger capacity investment (see, Hellwig and Irmen (2001) for details). Thus, the simpler
specication treated here abstracts from eects on rm size in an environment with changing levels
of innovation investments. Otherwise, it does not aect the generality of my results.
8innovation becomes embodied in the sector specic productivity indicators (At;Bt),
(At+1;Bt+1);:::; with no further scope for proprietary exploitation. The evolution
of these indicators will be specied below. If rms decide not to undertake an
innovation investment in period t, then they have access to the production technique
represented by At 1 and Bt 1 such that at = At 1(1   ) and bt = Bt 1(1   ),
respectively.
2.3.2 Prot Maximization and Zero-Prots
Per-period prots in units of the current nal good are
L;t = pL;tyl;t   wtlt   i(q
A
t ); K;t = pK;tyk;t   Rtkt   i(q
B
t ); (2.12)
where pL;tyl;t, pK;tyk;t is the respective rm's revenue from output sales, wtlt, Rtkt
its wage bill at the real wage rate wt and its capital cost at the real rental rate of
capital Rt, and i(q
j
t), j = A;B, its outlays for innovation investment.
Firms choose a production plan (yl;t;lt;qA
t ) and (yk;t;kt;qB
t ) taking the sequence
fpL;t;pK;t;wt;Rtg1
t=1 of real prices and the sequence fAt 1;Bt 1g1
t=1 of aggregate
productivity indicators as given. They choose a production plan that maximizes the
sum of the present discounted values of prots in all periods. Because production
choices for dierent periods are independent of each other, for each period t, they
choose the plan (yl;t;lt;qA
t ) and (yk;t;kt;qB
t ) that maximizes the prot L;t and K;t,
respectively.
If a rm innovates, it incurs an investment cost i(q
j
t) > 0 that is associated with a
given innovation rate q
j
t > 0 and is independent of the output yl;t or yk;t. An inno-
vation investment is only prot-maximizing if the rm's margin is strictly positive,
i.e., if pL;t > wt=at or pK;t > Rt=bt. Then, there is a positive scale eect, namely if
the rm innovates, it wants to apply the innovation to as large an output as possible
and produces at the capacity limit, i.e., yl;t = 1 or yk;t = 1. The choice of (lt;qA
t )
and (kt;qB
t ) must then minimize the costs of producing the capacity output, i.e.,
assuming wt > 0 and Rt > 0 these input combinations must satisfy
lt =
1































9Given the convexity of the innovation cost function and the fact that limqj!0 i0(qj) =
0, j = A;B, the following conditions determine a unique level ^ qA
t > 0 and ^ qB
t > 0
as the solution to the rst-order conditions
wt
At 1(1    + ^ qA








Bt 1(1    + ^ qB







These conditions relate the marginal reduction of a rm's wage bill/capital cost
to the marginal increase in its investment costs. Upon dividing one by the other
and rearranging reveals that Hicks' conjecture mentioned in the Introduction is







(1    + ^ qA




(1    + ^ qB




Since the numerator of the right-hand side increases in ^ qA
t and the denominator
increases in ^ qB
t , an increase in the relative price of labor induces, ceteris paribus,
relatively more labor-saving technical change, i.e., a hike in wt=Rt means a greater
ratio ^ qA
t =^ qB
t . However, to pin down the latter ratio one has to know the relative
factor prices per eciency unit, i.e., the ratio (wt=At 1)=(Rt=Bt 1), where \e-
ciency" refers to the level of technology before innovation investments are under-
taken. Changes in this ratio determine the direction of technical change.
If a rm's margin is not strictly positive, i.e., pL;t  wt=at or pK;t  Rt=bt, then it
will not invest. In case of a zero-margin, any plan (yl;t;lt;0) with yl;t 2 [0;1] and lt =
yl;t=At 1 (1   ) or (yk;t;lt;0) with yk;t 2 [0;1] and kt = yk;t=Bt 1 (1   ) maximizes
L
t or K
t , respectively. Without loss of generality and to simplify the notation, I
assume for this case that intermediate-good rms still produce the capacity output.
If a rm faces a strictly negative margin, it won't produce and (0;0;0) is the optimal
plan.
2.4 Consolidating the Production Sector
Turning to the implications for the general equilibrium, recall that the set of each
sector of intermediate-good rms is R+ with Lebesgue measure. Consider equi-
libria where both intermediates are produced. Then, the maximum prot of any
intermediate-good rm producing the labor- or the capital-intensive intermediate
must be zero at any t. Indeed, since the supply of labor and capital is bounded in
each period, the set of intermediate-good rms employing more than some " > 0
units of labor or capital must have bounded measure and hence must be smaller
than the set of all intermediate-good rms. Given that inactive intermediate-good
10rms must be maximizing prots just like the active ones, I need that maximum
prots of all active intermediate-good rms at equilibrium prices are equal to zero.
Using (2.12), (2.13), and (2.15), I nd for prot-maximizing intermediate-good rms
earning zero prots in equilibrium that





t ) + i(^ q
A





t ) + i(^ q
B
t ); (2.17)
i.e., the price is equal to variable cost plus xed costs when wt=at and Rt=bt are
consistent with prot-maximization as required by (2.15). Upon combining the
equilibrium conditions of the nal-good sector and both intermediate-good sectors
the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 If (2.7), (2.8), and (2.17) hold for all producing rms at t, then
there are maps, gA : R++ ! R++ and gB : R++ ! R++, such that ^ qA
t = gA (t) and
^ qB
t = gB (t) satisfy
g
A
 (t) > 0 and g
B
 (t) < 0 for all t > 0: (2.18)
Proposition 1 states a key property of the production sector. The equilibrium incen-
tives to engage in labor- and capital-saving technical change depend on the factor
intensity of the nal-good sector. This is due to the properties of the production
function F. Under constant returns to scale and positive, yet decreasing marginal
products, both intermediate-good inputs are complements in the production of the
nal good. Hence, having relatively more of YK;t, i.e., a higher t, increases pL;t and
decreases pK;t. These price movements increase ^ qA
t and decrease ^ qB
t in accordance
with (2.17).
2.5 Evolution of Technological Knowledge
The evolution of the economy's level of technological knowledge is given by the
evolution of the aggregate indicators At and Bt. An important question is then how
these indicators are linked to the innovation investments of individual intermediate-
good rms.
Labor- and capital-saving productivity growth occurs at those intermediate-good
rms that produce at t. Denoting the measure of the rms producing the labor- and
the capital-intensive intermediate in t by nt and mt, respectively, their contribution
11to At and Bt is equal to the highest level of labor and capital productivity attained
by one of them, i.e.,
At = maxfat(n) = At 1
 






Bt = maxfbt(m) = Bt 1
 





Since in equilibrium qA
t (n) = qA
t and qB
t (m) = qB
t , I have at = At 1
 






1    + qB
t

. Hence, for all t = 1;2;:::
At = At 1
 




and Bt = Bt 1
 





with A0 > 0 and B0 > 0 as initial conditions.
3 Intertemporal General Equilibrium
3.1 Denition
A price system corresponds to a sequence fpL;t;pK;t;wt;Rtg
1












t=1 for all cohorts, consumption of the old at t = 1,
co
1, a strategy fYt;YK;t;YL;tg1
t=1 for the nal-good sector, measures nt and mt of
intermediate-good rms active at t producing the capacity output yl;t = yk;t = 1
with input choices (lt;qA
t ), and (kt;qB
t ) resulting in the respective productivity levels
(at;bt), and demanding the aggregate supply of labor and capital, Lt and Kt.
For an exogenous evolution of the labor force, Lt = L0 (1 + )
t with L0 > 0 and
 > ( 1), a given initial level of capital, K1 > 0, and initial values of technological
knowledge, A0 > 0 and B0 > 0, an intertemporal general equilibrium corresponds to
a price system, an allocation, and a sequence fAt 1;Bt 1g1
t=1 of indicators for the
level of aggregate technological knowledge that satisfy the following conditions for
all t = 1;2;:::;1:
(E1) The young of each period save according to (2.3) and supply Lt units of labor.
(E2) The production sector satises Proposition 1.











t = Yt; (3.1)
12where IK
t is capital investment, IA
t and IB
t denote aggregate innovation investments
in labor- and capital-saving technical change.
(E4) The market for both intermediates clears, i.e.,
YL;t = nt and YK;t = mt: (3.2)
(E5) There is full employment of labor and capital, i.e.,
ntlt = Lt and mtkt = Kt: (3.3)
(E6) The productivity indicators At and Bt evolve according to (2.20).
(E1) guarantees optimal behavior of all households under perfect foresight. Since
the old at t = 1 own the capital stock, their consumption is L0co
1 = R1K1. (E2)
assures optimal behavior of all rms. Due to constant returns to scale in nal-good
production, there are no prots in equilibrium. The resource constraint (3.1) of (E3)
reects the fact that capital fully depreciates after one period.
Market clearing for each intermediate good (E4), full employment of labor and
capital (E5), (2.13), and the updating condition (E6) imply that nt = AtLt and
mt = BtKt. Hence, in equilibrium, we have


















i.e., aggregate output of each intermediate good is equal to the respective input
in eciency units, and aggregate investment in labor- and capital-saving technical
change is proportionate to the respective input in eciency units. Observe that




1    + gB (t)

Kt
At 1 (1    + gA (t))Lt
(3.6)
Thus, in equilibrium t is the intensity of ecient capital per unit of ecient labor.
For short, I shall henceforth refer to t as the `ecient capital intensity' as op-
posed to the `capital intensity', i.e., the amount of capital per worker Kt=Lt. With
this in mind Proposition 1 may be reinterpreted from a perspective of the general
equilibrium.
Corollary 1 At all t, the equilibrium incentives to engage in capital- and labor-
saving technical change depend on the ratio Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt. If this ratio increases
(decreases), then ^ qA
t increases (decreases) and ^ qB
t decreases (increases).
13Corollary 1 links Hicks' conjecture about relative factor prices as stated in condition
(2.16) to relative factor endowments. Moreover, it emphasizes that the correct mea-
sure of relative scarcity is the amount of ecient capital per unit of ecient labor,
where `ecient' refers to the technological level at the beginning of the respective
period, i.e., before innovation investments are being undertaken. If Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt
increases, then t also increases. Since gA
 (t) > 0 > gB
 (t), ^ qA
t increases and
^ qB
t decreases. It is in this sense that the relative scarcity of factors of production
induces technical change.
3.2 The Dynamical System




t = stLt = Kt+1 for t = 1;2;:::;1: (3.7)
The evolution of the economy can then be characterized by means of two state
variables, namely the ecient capital intensity of the nal-good sector, t, and the
level of capital-saving technological knowledge, Bt.
For further reference it proves useful to introduce some additional variables. I denote
the real wage per eciency unit and the real rental rate of capital per eciency unit
by wt=At  ~ w(t) and Rt=Bt  ~ R(t). Then, the equilibrium real rental rate of
capital and the equilibrium real wage become respectively R(t) = Bt ~ R(t) and
w(t) = At ~ w(t).
Proposition 2 (Dynamical System)








1    + gA (t+1)













1    + gB (1)

K1
A0 (1    + gA (1))L0(1 + )
> 0; B1 = B0
 




14According to Proposition 2, the dynamical system is a two-dimensional system of
rst-order, autonomous, non-linear dierence equations. The equation of motion for
the ecient capital intensity is (3.8). It restates the condition for savings to equal
capital investment (3.7) where Kt+1 is replaced by an update of (3.6). Since pref-
erences are homothetic and wt is proportionate to At, the latter drops out on both
sides of the equation. Observe further that (3.8) collapses to Diamond's dierence
equation for the capital intensity if we eliminate capital- and labor-saving technical.
Equation (3.9) determines the evolution of the level of capital-saving technological
knowledge. For any given pair (t;Bt) 2 R++, (3.8) assigns a unique value t+1
which is then used to nd Bt+1 with (3.9). Since K1;L0;A0; and B0 are initial
conditions and L1 = (1 + )L0, 1 is pinned down by (3.6) for t = 1.
Dene a steady state as a trajectory along which all variables grow at a constant
rate. From (3.9) I deduce that a trajectory with Bt+1=Bt   1 = const: requires
t = t+1 = . Moreover, according to (3.8), the latter needs Bt+1 = Bt = B.















) =  (3.12)
Proposition 3 (Steady State)





0() + i() > lim
!1f
0(): (3.13)
2. The steady-state growth rate of the economy is g  At+1=At 1 = gA () .










































= (1 + g
)(1 + );

























15According to Proposition 3, a steady state exists if the marginal product of the
capital-intensive intermediate good in nal-good production is suciently high (low)
when YK ! 0 (YK ! 1). Then, condition (3.13) assures a value  2 (0;1) such
that the zero-prot condition of intermediate-good rms of the capital-intensive
sector is satised at ^ qB = .9 At this value pK = f0() is the revenue whereas
i0()+i() is the total cost of such a rm. Clearly, condition (3.13) would always hold
if I had imposed the usual Inada conditions on the nal-good production function F.
On the other hand, a violation of (3.13) implies that Bt either becomes unbounded
or vanishes in the limit as t ! 1.
Contrary to the one-sector neoclassical growth model where multiple steady states
with  2 (0;1) may exist if capital and labor are poor substitutes (see, e.g.,
Galor (1996)), the steady state is unique in my setting. The reason is that here
the steady-state capital intensity  is not determined by the dierence equation for
capital accumulation. Instead,  adjusts such that additions to the stock of capital-
saving technological knowledge just oset depreciation. Then, given , there is a
unique steady-state level of capital-saving technological knowledge B that satises
(3.11).
Statement 2 of Proposition 3 gives a complete list of the steady-state evolution.
The steady-state growth rate of the economy is equal to the growth rate of the
stock of labor-saving technological knowledge. Labor productivity, the real wage,
and individual consumption and savings grow at this rate. Aggregate variables such
as Yt or Kt grow at rate g + . There is no growth of capital-saving technological
knowledge. The rental rate of capital and intermediate-good prices are constant.
With these results at hand, it is straightforward to see that the steady state is
consistent with Kaldor's facts (Kaldor (1961)) as long as g > 0.
For the upcoming analysis it is important to keep in mind that the determination
of the steady-state ecient capital intensity as well as the steady-state growth rate
is independent of the household sector. In fact, they only hinge on parameters that
characterize the production sector. For instance, if F =  (YK;t)
1  (YL;t)
,   > 0,





























Quite intuitively,  increases in the productivity parameter   and decreases in
the innovation cost parameter v0. The steady-state growth rate g = gA ()   
9In light of Proposition 1, condition (3.13) may also be stated as lim!0 gB() >  >
lim!1 gB(). Hence, diminishing returns to (ecient) capital still play a key role here since
they imply gB
 (t) < 0.
16Figure 3.1: The Phase-Diagram of the Locally Stable Steady State (;B).
inherits these comparative statics. In Appendix C, I show that the steady-state
growth rate g is broadly consistent with the long-run growth performance of today's
industrialized countries for reasonable parameter values.
To get an idea of the transitional dynamics involved, consider the phase diagram
in the (Bt;t) { plane shown in Figure 3.1 (see Appendix B for details). Based on
(3.8), I denote the locus of all pairs (Bt;t) for which the evolution of t is at a point
of rest by t = 0  f(Bt;t)jt+1   t = 0g. I assume this locus to be stable in a
suciently small neighborhood of the steady state. This assumption may be justied
with reference to the analysis of Diamond (1965) where the focus is also conned to
locally stable steady states. As a consequence, the horizontal arrows point towards
the t = 0 { locus. Moreover, this locus is strictly increasing. Intuitively, t = 0
requires dt+1 = dt whereas local stability means here that dt+1 < dt. Then,
from (3.8), dBt=dt > 0 is necessary to reestablish dt+1 = dt following a change
dt 6= 0.
The locus Bt = 0  f(Bt;t)jBt+1   Bt = 0g gives all pairs (Bt;t), for which the
evolution of Bt is at a point of rest. In the vicinity of the steady state, this locus is
strictly decreasing and stable. Intuitively, Bt = 0 requires  = gB (t+1), i.e., t+1
must not change as I vary t. Since any change dt > 0 increases the left-hand side
of (3.8), I need dBt < 0 to oset this eect. Hence, the negative slope. The stability
of this locus may also be deduced from (3.8). Since dBt > 0 (dBt < 0) implies an
increase (decrease) in t+1, I have  > gB (t+1) above and  < gB (t+1) below the
17Bt = 0 { locus. Accordingly, the vertical arrows point towards Bt = 0.
The continuous time representation of the trajectories in Figure 3.1 does not sub-
stitute for a discrete time analysis which is provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If the locus t = 0 is stable in a vicinity of (;B), then the steady
state is either a stable node or a clockwise spiral sink.
4 Population Aging, Labor Force Growth, and
the Direction of Technical Change
This section studies the eect of a permanent decline in the growth rate of the labor
force  on the direction of technical change. This is equivalent to an increase in
the old-age dependency ratio at t dened as Lt 1=Lt = (1 + )
 1. Increases in the
latter are meant to capture the tendencies shown in Table 1. For ease of notation, I
consider an economy in the steady state when a change in  occurs. Proposition 4
has the main result of this section.
Proposition 4 (Labor Force Growth, Comparative Statics and Dynamics)
Consider an economy in the steady state in period t = 1. Then, it experiences a small
and permanent decline in its labor force growth rate such that Lt = L1(1+0)t 1 with
 > 0 > ( 1) for all t = 2;3;:::;1: Denote variables associated with an evolution
under 0 by an apostrophe such that (0;B0) is the steady state under 0.
1. It holds that 0
2 >  and B0
2 < B.
2. It holds that 0 =  and B0 < B.
According to the rst claim of Proposition 4 an increase in the old-age dependency
ratio leads to a higher ecient capital intensity and a lower level of capital-saving
technical knowledge. This is the result of two opposing forces on the capital intensity
of t = 2. On the one hand, the labor force will be smaller under 0 than under .
From Corollary 1, I know that this leads, ceteris paribus, to a higher ecient capital
intensity. On the other hand, under rational expectations, generation 1 may reduce
18its savings rate to a lower rental rate of capital.10 The point of the rst claim is
that the former eect dominates the latter. Therefore, between t = 1 and t = 2
the capital intensity grows faster than along the steady-state trajectory with .
Following Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, and Summers (1990), I refer to this acceleration
in capital deepening as the Solow eect. In view of Corollary 1, the Solow eect
induces Hicks eects: since 0
2 >  there is more labor-saving and less capital-saving
technical change. In other words, gA (0
2) > gA () and gB (0
2) <  = gB () where
the latter implies B0
2 < B. Hence, population aging aects the relative scarcity of
factors of production and becomes a determinant of the direction of technical change.
How does aging aect the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) between t = 1
and t = 2? To address this question I use (2.4), (3.4) and (3.5) and express GDP
and per-capita GDP at t as















To assess the impact of aging on these variables, I consider the dierential evolution
of GDP2 and gdp2 under 0 and  and evaluate this dierence at the evolution under
, i.e.,








2)   GDP2 (K2;L2;A2;B2);
(4.2)








2)   gdp2 (K2;L2;A2;B2);
where B2 = B, A2 = A1
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Corollary 2 (Aging, GDP, and per-capita GDP)
1. It holds that
dGDP2 (K2;L2;A2;B2)  R2 (K
0
2   K2) + w2 (L
0
2   L2) < 0: (4.3)
10There are at least two cases where this second channel is mute since savings do not adjust to
a lower rental rate of capital. First, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to one,
then savings are independent of it. Second, if expectations of generation 1 are not rational but
\myopic" (Michel and de la Croix (2000)) such that the marginal propensity to save out of wage
income at t becomes s(Rt;) = s(R();).





















According to Corollary 2 aging reduces GDP2 because there is less capital and less
labor in t = 2. The former eect is the result of a lower expected rental rate of
capital, the latter is the direct eect of aging on the evolution of the labor force.
Both eects are proportionate to the respective factor price. More importantly,
induced technical change does not play a role here. In fact, as emphasized by
Acemoglu (2007), the choice of technology in a competitive economy is such that
it maximizes GDPt at given factor endowments (Kt;Lt). Therefore, the induced
changes of qA
2 and qB
2 have no rst-order eect on GDP2.
The eect of aging on per-capita GDP is indeterminate in general. This reects the
fact that less labor may reduce GDP by more than population. The rst term in
parenthesis of (4.4) captures this tension. However, if the labor share w2L2=GDP2 is
close to 2=3 and  close to zero, the eect on aggregate output is likely to dominate.
Then, as K0
2  K2, per-capita GDP falls in response to population aging.
Finally, it is worth noting that Claim 1 of Proposition 4 as well as Corollary 2 hold
for any pair of adjacent periods that experience a small decline in the labor force
growth rate. Hence, their applicability is not restricted to the steady state as the
starting point.
Let me get back to Claim 2 of Proposition 4 which has the steady-state eects
of a permanent increase in the old-age dependency ratio. In accordance with the
interpretation of Proposition 3 the steady-state ecient capital intensity remains
unaected and so does the steady-state growth rate. However, there is a level eect
on capital-saving technological knowledge. From (3.11), I deduce that B declines
at the same rate as the growth factor of the labor force.
To understand the role of capital-saving technical change for the steady-state eects
consider the phase diagram of Figure 4.1 (again, see Appendix B for details). At
B, the one time and permanent decline in  shifts the t = 0 { locus to the right
since savings per unit of next period's workers increase and (;B) is locally stable.
In a world without capital-saving technical change, the new steady state would be
at point Z since the evolution of t is stable around  given B. Intuitively, this
shift reects the Solow eect and the Hicks eect on labor-saving technical change.
As a consequence, such a framework predicts that a permanent decline in  induces
20Figure 4.1: Comparative Statics and Dynamics for a Permanent Decline in the
Growth Rate of the Labor Force. The Case of a Stable Node.
faster steady-state growth due to the Hicks eect on labor-saving technical change.
Once the direction of technical change is endogenous, point Z cannot be a steady
state: to the right of , the growth rate of Bt is strictly negative.
5 Extensions
5.1 Contemporaneous Knowledge Spillovers
What is the eect of population aging on the direction of technical change in a
competitive economy with contemporaneous knowledge spillovers? To allow for
such an externality I replace (2.10) by
at(n) = At 1

1    + q
A














1    + q
B











where  2 R+, n 2 [0;nt], and m 2 [0;mt]. The terms in squared brackets represent
the knowledge externality that is external to the respective intermediate-good rm.
21It is proportionate to the average of the net productivity growth rates achieved by
all rms of the respective sector.
The incorporation of contemporaneous knowledge spillovers requires some modi-
cations that, however, do not invalidate the qualitative results established so far
except for those of Corollary 2. To get an idea of the necessary changes, observe
that the reasoning that led to Proposition 1 delivers now a symmetric equilibrium
conguration with qA
t (n) = qA
t , qB
t (m) = qB
t , at = At 1
 






1    + (1 + )qB
t

. Moreover, there are maps gA : R2
++ ! R++ and
gB : R2
++ ! R++, such that ^ qA
t = gA (t;) and ^ qB
t = gB (t;) with gA
 (t;) >
0 > gB
 (t;), and gi
(t;) < 0, i = A;B. Substituting these functions in (3.8) -
(3.10) delivers the dynamical system with contemporaneous spillovers. Its steady-
state ecient capital intensity satises gB(;) = =(1 + ). Hence,  = ()
and B = B(). A unique steady state with () 2 (0;1) and B() 2 (0;1)
exists if and only if lim!0 f0() > i0(=(1+))+i(=(1+)) > lim!1 f0(), which
replaces (3.13). Moreover, the steady-state growth rate of the economy becomes
g() = (1 + )gA (();)   .
To understand the role of contemporaneous knowledge spillovers for the eect of
aging on the economy, consider its GDPt and gdpt of (4.1) replacing gi(t) by
gi(t;), i = A;B. In analogy to (4.2), I denote by dGDP2 (K2;L2;A2;B2;) and
dgdp2 (K2;L2;A2;B2;) the dierential eect of a small decline in the work force in
t = 2 on the evolution of GDP and per-capita GDP if  > 0.
Corollary 3 (Spillovers, Aging, GDP, and per-capita GDP)













where the evaluation is at (K2;L2;A2;B2;):
1. It holds that
dGDP2 (K2;L2;A2;B2;)  R2(K
0
2   K2) + w2(L
0
2   L2) + E ():(5.3)
























22Corollary 3 extends the ndings of Corollary 2 to the case where  > 0. The new
feature is the presence of E() in (5.3) and (5.4). It captures the eect of population
aging on the evolution of GDP and gdp through induced technical change.
According to (5.2), the expression E() consists of two factors. First, there is the
eect of a changing capital intensity, on the ecient capital intensity 2. In light
of Proposition 4, I have K0
2=L0
2 > K2=L2, hence, d2() = 0
2    > 0. The second
factor, i.e., the term in brackets of (5.2), has the eect of induced technical change on
GDP2. Unlike in the scenario without contemporaneous knowledge spillovers, this
eect does not vanish. In fact, due to the externality there is too little innovation in
the competitive economy such that sign[@GDP2 ()=@qi
2] > 0, i = A;B. However,
since gA
 (2;) > 0 > gB
 (2;), the sign of the term in brackets is indeterminate in
general. Hence, for the results of Corollary 2 to go through, I have to assume that
contemporaneous knowledge spillovers are weak such that  is suciently close zero.
5.2 Increasing Life-Expectancy
Thus far, I studied aging as a decline in the growth rate of the labor force. However,
only a slight reinterpretation of the analytical framework is necessary to allow for
the incorporation of the eect of an increasing life expectancy on the direction of
technical change. To accomplish this, suppose that each individual faces a proba-
bility to die at the onset of old age equal to (1   ) 2 (0;1). Let  2 (0;1) denote
the discount factor that the individual applies in the presence of a probability to
die. Moreover, normalize u(0) = 0 to be the utility after death. Under these as-
sumptions, we may interpret Ut of (2.1) as the expected utility of generation t with
    as the eective discount factor. The old-age dependency ratio at t becomes
Lt 1=Lt and increases in .
There is a perfect annuity market for insurance against survival risk. Then the
economy inherits the properties established in Proposition 1, 2, 3, and Lemma 1.
However, since the savings rate becomes a function of life expectancy, the following
proposition holds.11
Proposition 5 (Life Expectancy, Comparative Statics and Dynamics)
Consider an economy in a steady state in period t = 1. Then, it experiences a
small and permanent increase in its life expectancy such that the eective discount
11Without a perfect annuity market there are unintended bequests to deal with and the eect of
an increase in life-expectancy on aggregate savings is indeterminate in general (see, e.g., Sheshinski
(2007) for a discussion).
23factor increases, i.e., 0 >  for all generations t = 1;2;3;:::;1: Denote variables
associated with an evolution under 0 by an apostrophe such that (0;B0) is the
steady state under 0.
1. If generation 1 anticipates the increase in its life expectancy, then 0
2 >  and
B0
2 < B. If this change is anticipated by all generations t = 2;3;:::;1 and
not by generation 1, then 0
2 = , B0
2 = B and 0
3 > , B0
3 < B.
2. It holds that 0 =  and B0 < B.
Intuitively, an anticipated higher life expectancy increases savings per next period's
worker since the weight on expected old-age utility increases. This dominates the
eect of a declining real rental rate of capital. Then, initially the eective capital
intensity increases. However, contrary to the case of a permanent decline in the
growth rate of the labor force, this eect may be delayed by one generation if gen-
eration 1 makes its plan anticipating an eective discount factor of  instead of 0.
Arguably, this is the relevant case since expectations of one's own life expectancy
are often myopic, i.e., coincide with the actual life expectancy of the previous gen-




2) is usually made before the change in the survival probability is
experienced. As a consequence, the eect of a permanent increase in life expectancy
on the direction of technical change may be delayed by one generation.
Since the steady-state ecient capital intensity is independent of the household
sector, the qualitative nding on the long-run implications mimic those of Proposi-
tion 4: an increase in life expectancy has no eect on the steady-state growth rate,
however, the steady-state rate of return on capital falls since B0 < B.
The initial eect of an increasing life expectancy on GDP in absolute and per-
capita terms may be directly deduced from Corollary 3. Since K0
2  K2 and
L0
2 = L2, (5.3) and (5.4) deliver dGDP2 (K2;L2;A2;B2;)  R2(K0
2   K2) + E (),
which is positive if  is suciently small and K0
2 > K2. As to per-capita GDP,
I nd dgdp2 (K2;L2;A2;B2;)  [R2 (K0
2   K2) + E()]=[L1 + L2]   gdp2L1(0  
)=[L1 + L2]. The sign is indeterminate even if  is small. It will be negative if a
higher  increases population by more than GDP2.
6 Concluding Remarks
What is the role of population aging for the direction of technical change and eco-
nomic performance? I address this question in a competitive economy that exhibits
24endogenous capital- and labor-saving technical change. Population aging corre-
sponds either to a decline in the growth rate of the labor force or to an increase in
life-expectancy. Both phenomena increase the economy's old-age dependency ratio.
Contrary to the existing literature on aging and endogenous growth, I nd that the
steady-state growth rate is independent of the economy's age structure. However,
population aging aects the transitional dynamics. Even if the current young reduce
their savings in anticipation of a declining rental rate of capital, the relative scarcity
of labor increases. This leads to more labor- and less capital- saving technical change.
Unless there are contemporaneous knowledge spillovers, this change in the direction
of technical change fails to have a rst-order eect on the evolution GDP. If aging
takes the form of a declining labor force growth rate, it reduces GDP because it
lowers the growth of the work force and of the capital stock. Per-capita GDP is
then likely to decline, too, since the eect on GDP more than outweighs the one on
population growth.
An increase in life expectancy has the potential to raise GDP along the transition
if it leads to more savings and capital accumulation. However, these eects may
be delayed if a rise in life expectancy is not anticipated. Overall, the presence
of contemporaneous knowledge spillovers makes it more dicult to come up with
clear-cut predictions on the relationship between population aging, the direction of
technical change, and economic performance.
The present analysis suggests several routes for future research. They include the
following. First, one may want to understand the role of scal policy in an econ-
omy with endogenous capital- and labor-saving technical change. The fact that
the steady-state growth rate is independent of the household sector suggests that
steady-state growth eects that arise, e.g., in Saint-Paul (1992), may not obtain
once endogenous capital-saving technical change is allowed for.
Second, the question arises to what extend the implications for the transitional
dynamics hinge on the assumption of a household sector with two-period lived in-
dividuals. While this framework has the advantage of an intuitive representation of
aging and of analytical tractability, it abstracts from facets that may impinge on
the relationship between aging and the direction of technical change such as ele-
ments of intragenerational heterogeneity or intergenerational transfers. I leave these
questions for future research.
25A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Upon substitution of (2.7) and (2.8) in the respective zero-prot condition of (2.17), we obtain
f (t)   t f0 (t) = (1    + ^ qA
t )i0(^ qA
t ) + i(^ qA
t );
(A.1)
f0 (t) = (1    + ^ qB
t )i0(^ qB
t ) + i(^ qB
t ):
Denote RHS(q) the right-hand side of both conditions. In view of the properties of the function
i given in (2.11), RHS(q) is a mapping RHS(q) : R+ ! R+ with RHS0(q) > 0 for q  0 and
limq!1 RHS(q) = 1. Moreover, the properties of the function f(t) imply that the left-hand
side of both conditions is strictly positive for t > 0. Hence, for each t > 0 there is a unique
^ q
j
t > 0, j = A;B, that satises the respective condition stated in (A.1). I denote these maps by
^ q
j
t = gj (t), j = A;B.



































 (t) < 0:
The respective signs follow from the properties of the functions f and i. 
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Equation (3.6) is a xed-point problem with a unique solution ^ t > 0. To see this, write the
right-hand side of (3.6) as RHS (t;Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt). Given the properties of gA (t) and gB (t)
as stated in (2.18) and Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt > 0, the function RHS (t;Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt) is continuous,
strictly decreasing and strictly positive for all t > 0. Hence, limt!0 RHS (t;) > 0. Accordingly,
there is a unique ^ t > 0 such that ^ t = RHS (^ t;Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt).
Ceteris paribus, a greater Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt shifts the function RHS (t;Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt) upwards.
Therefore, ^ t is greater the greater Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt. Then, from (2.18), ^ qA
t = gA (t) increases
whereas ^ qB
t = gB (t) decreases. Obviously, the opposite response obtains when Bt 1Kt=At 1Lt
falls. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof consists of two steps. First, I show that the variables t and Bt are indeed state variables
of the economy at t. Second, I prove the existence of a unique equilibrium sequence ft;Btg1
t=1.
261. Given Lt 1, Lt, and Kt, the equilibrium determines 22 variables belonging to period t. One
readily veries that there are also 22 conditions for each period. Since ^ qA = gA (t) and
^ qB = gB (t) according to Proposition 1, it is also straightforward to verify that all prices
fpL;t;pK;t;wt;Rtg
1
t=1 depend on t. Moreover, fYt;YK;t;YL;t;nt;mt;at;bt;lt;ktg1
t=1 as well
as fAt;Btg1
t=1 depend on t. In addition, yL;t = yK;t = 1. With this in mind, individual
savings of (2.3) becomes st = s(R(t+1);)w(t), where
w(t)  At 1
 
1    + gA (t)









1    + gB (t+1)






Both factor prices, w(t) and R(t+1), are found from the respective zero-prot condi-
tion given in (2.12) and Proposition 1. The individual budget constraints deliver c
y
t =
(1   s(R(t+1);))w(t) and co
t = R(t) s(R(t);)w(t 1). For t = 1, we have by
assumption that co
1 = R(1)K1=L0.





1    + gA (t+1)

Bt (1    + gB (t+1))
Lt+1; for t = 1;2;:::;1: (A.5)
Using st = s(R(t+1);)w(t) and wt=At  ~ w(t) gives after some straightforward ma-
nipulations (3.8).
The second dierence equation of the dynamical system states the evolution of Bt+1 de-
scribed by (2.20) where qB
t+1 is replaced by gB (t+1) in accordance with Proposition 1.
In the rst period, 1 is pinned down by (3.6) for given initial values A0, B0, L0, K1 and
L1 = (1 + )L0. From the proof of Corollary 1, there is a unique solution 1 > 0.
Before we turn to the uniqueness of the sequence ft;Btg1




1    + gA (t)




It holds for all t > 0 that
~ w(t) > 0 and ~ w0 (t) > 0;
~ R(t) > 0 and ~ R0 (t) < 0;
w(t) > 0 and w0 (t) > 0; (A.7)
R(t) > 0 and R0 (t) < 0;
	(t) > 0 and 	0 (t) > 0 with lim
t!0
	(t) = 0 and lim
t!1
	(t) = 1:
27Proof of Lemma 2
First, I note that (2.12), Proposition 1, and the updating conditions (2.20) deliver











With (A.1), this gives
~ w(t) =
 















where, for t > 0, the signs follow from Proposition 1 and the properties of the function i
given in (2.11). It follows that

























Again, for t > 0, the signs follow from Proposition 1 and the properties of the function i
given in (2.11).
The third and the forth claim of (A.7) follow immediately from (A.9) and (A.10) since the
updating conditions (2.20) imply
w(t) = At 1
 















As to the fth claim of (A.7), I note that 	(t) > 0 and 	0 (t) > 0 follow immediately
from the denition of 	 given in (A.6), Proposition 1, and the fact that sR (t;)  0.
Since gA (t) is increasing on R++ and bounded from below by zero, limt!0 gA (t) is
nite and limt!1 gA (t) is nite or innite. Since gB (t) is decreasing on R++ and
bounded from below by zero, limt!0 gB (t) is either nite or innite and limt!1 gB (t)
is nite. It follows that limt!0
 













1    + gB (t)

is either nite or innite.
Since s(R(t);) 2 (0;1) for all t 2 R++ and sR (R(t);)  0, I nd that 1 
limt!0 s(R(t);) > 0 and 1 > limt!1 s(R(t);)  0 if sR (R(t);) > 0. Other-
wise, s(R(t);) is independent of t. Hence, I have limt!0 	(t) = 0 and limt!1 	(t) =
1. 
Rearranging (3.8) gives
Bt ~ w(t) = 	(t+1): (A.12)
According to Lemma 2, the left-hand side of (A.12) is strictly positive for any (t;Bt) 2
R2
++. Moreover, the right-hand side of (A.12) is increasing on R++ approaching zero as
t+1 ! 0 and innity as t+1 ! 1. Hence, there is a unique t+1 that satises (3.8) given
(t;Bt) 2 R2
++. With this value at hand, (3.9) delivers a unique Bt+1 > 0. 
28A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
1. First, I prove the \if"-part before I turn to the \only if"-part.
 \)": If condition (3.13) holds then (A.1) delivers for the capital-intensive intermediate-
good sector lim!0 gB () >  > lim!1 gB (). The latter is necessary and sucient
for (3.12) to have at least one solution  2 (0;1) given that gB () is continuous
according to Proposition 1.
The existence of a steady state (;B) 2 R2
++ follows from (3.11) and Lemma 2.
They assure that a value B = 	()=w() 2 (0;1) exists since 	() > 0 and
~ w() > 0 for any  2 (0;1).
Uniqueness of  follows from gB
 () < 0 on R++. The uniqueness of B follows since
the total dierential of (A.12) reveals for any given t that dt+1=dBt > 0. Hence,
there is a unique B that satises (A.12) at t = t+1 = .
 \(": If i0() + i()  lim!0 f0(), then   lim!0 gB(). As a consequence, for
all  2 (0;1) the sequence fBtg1
t=1 is decreasing for all t. Accordingly, Bt 2 [0;B0]
and Bt  B0
 
1    + lim!0 gB()
t
. Therefore, limt!1 Bt = 0. If lim!1 f0() 
i0() + i() then lim!1 gB()  . Accordingly, the sequence fBtg1
t=1 is increasing
for all t and Bt  B0
 
1    + lim!1 gB()
t
. Hence, limt!1 Bt = 1.
2. Since (3.12) determines , I obtain from Proposition 1 and (2.20) that At+1=At   1 =




and st are immediate from at = At, (A.8), (2.3) with R = B [p
K   i()]. Steady-state
growth of Kt follows from (3.7). The evolution of kt and lt follow immediately from (2.13).
All other growth factors under b) result from (2.4) in conjunction with (E4), (E5), and (3.4).
From (2.7), I have p
K = f0 (). Then, (A.8) delivers R = B [p
K   i()]. 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
The following Result introduces some necessary notation for the analysis of the local stability of
the steady state.
Result 1 With (1;B1) given by (3.10), the dynamical system can be stated as




; t = 1;2;:::;1, (A.13)
where j : R++ ! R++, j = ;B, are continuously dierentiable functions.
Proof of Result 1
Write (3.8) and (3.9) as t+1 = h(t;Bt+1) and Bt+1 = z (t+1;Bt), where h and z are some
continuously dierentiable functions. With B0 as an initial condition and 1 determined by (3.10),
B1 is the equal to z (B0;1). Hence, we may state the the dynamical system as
t+1 = h(t;Bt+1); Bt+1 = z (t+1;Bt) t = 1;2;:::;1, (1;B1) given. (A.14)
Then, for any (t;Bt) these equations determine (t+1;Bt+1). More precisely, upon substitution
we obtain t+1 = h(t;z (t+1;Bt)) which implicitly denes t+1 =  (t;Bt). In turn, using the
29latter, we nd Bt+1 = z (t+1;Bt) = z ( (t;Bt);Bt)  B (t;Bt). Hence, we may state the
dynamical system as in (A.13). 
The steady state is a xed point of the system (A.13). To study the local behavior of the system












We study each of the four elements of the Jacobian in turn.
1. First, consider (t;Bt). Consider (3.8), which we repeat here for convenience in the form
of (A.12)
Bt ~ w(t) = 	(t+1):
The implicit function theorem assures that a function t+1 = (t;Bt) exists if 
(t;Bt) 
dt+1=dt and 
B(t;Bt)  dt+1=dBt exist. We show next that this is the case for all
(t;Bt) > 0.
(a) We start with 
(t;Bt). Implicit dierentiation of (3.8) gives

(t;Bt) =
Bt ~ w0 (t)
	0 (t+1)
> 0: (A.16)
Form Lemma 2 the numerator and the denominator are strictly positive. Hence, the
derivative (t;Bt) exists and is strictly positive for all (t;Bt).






The assumption that the locus t = 0 is stable in the vicinity of the steady state is
equivalent to 
(;B) 2 (0;1).
(b) Next, I turn to the derivative 






By Lemma 2, the derivative exists for all t+1 > 0 and is strictly positive. Evaluated














1    + gB ( (t;Bt))

 B (t;Bt): (A.20)
Since  (t;Bt) exists for all (t;Bt) > 0 so does B (t;Bt). We now characterize the
partial derivatives of this function.
30(a) First, consider B
 (t;Bt)  @Bt+1=@t. From (A.20) we have
B
 (t;Bt) = Bt gB
 ( (t;Bt)) 
 (t;Bt) < 0: (A.21)
Evaluated at the steady state, this gives
B
 (;B) = B gB
 () 
 (;B): (A.22)
(b) Next, we consider the derivative B




1    + gB ( (t;Bt))

+ Bt gB
 ( (t;Bt)) 
B (t;Bt):
Evaluated at the steady state, this gives
B




B (;B) 2 (0;1). Indeed, since gB
 < 0 and 
B (;B) > 0, we have
B
B (;B) < 1. Using (A.19) and the denition of 	 of (A.6) I nd
B
B (;B) > 0 ,
 








 () > 0; (A.24)
where s is evaluated at (R();). The sign follows from Proposition 1.














Denote 1 and 2 the eigenvalues of the Jacobian (A.25). With (A.17), (A.19), (A.22), and (A.23),


































  0, or







One readily veries that 1 is strictly increasing in B
B with 1jB




















. Hence, 2 2 (0;
p







If (A.26) is violated, then D has two distinct complex eigenvalues. Then, the steady state is a
spiral sink since det(D) = 
 < 1 (see, e.g., Galor (2007), Proposition 3.8). The stability of the
loci t = 0 and Bt = 0 imply the clockwise orientation of the spiral sink. 
31A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
1. Under rational expectations, generation 1 makes its plan (c
y
1;s1;co
2) anticipating a real rental
rate of capital equal to R2 = R(0
2). Then, the capital stock at t = 2 is equal to K2 =
s(R(0
2);)w1L1. Moreover, 0
2 is given by (3.8), i.e.,





From Lemma 2, I know that 	() is increasing for all  > 0. Hence, 0
2 >  as  > 0.
2. This follows immediately from (3.11) and (3.12) for  and 0 and  > 0. 
A.7 Proof of Corollary 2
Equations (4.3) and (4.4) are rst-order Taylor approximations of dGDP2 and dgdp2 at the steady-
state path under . I know from the proof of Proposition 4 that 0
2 > , hence K0
2  K2. Moreover,
0 <  implies L0
2 < L2.






































= R2 > 0; (A.28)
where @2()=@L2 < 0 and @2()=@K2 > 0 are implicitly given by (3.6) for t = 2. The partial
eect of L2 on GDP2 is @GDP2 ()=@L2 = A2






coincides with w2 = w(2) = w() using (A.3). Since gi










































The expressions in brackets coincide with equilibrium prots of intermediate-good rms at t = 2
and are therefore equal to zero in accordance with Proposition 1. The same reasoning proves the
result for a small change in K2 as given in (A.28). Hence, (4.3) holds.
As to (4.4), I use (A.27) and (A.28) to derive dgdp2=dL2 and dgdp2=dK2. Straightforward manip-
ulations of these derivatives deliver (4.4). 
A.8 Proof of Corollary 3
Equations (5.3) and (5.4) are rst-order Taylor approximations of dGDP2 and dgdp2 at the steady-
state path under . Since Proposition 4 also holds if  > 0, I have 0
2 > (), hence d2() =
32@2()=@L2 (L0
2   L2) + @2()=@K2 (K0
2   K2) > 0, where the evaluation is at (K2;L2;A2;B2;)
and @2 ()=@L2 < 0 and @2 ()=@K2 > 0 are implicitly given by (3.6) for t = 2 with gi
 (2;)
replacing gi
 (2), i = A;B.
The total eect of a small change of L2 and K2 on GDP2 at (K2;L2;A2;B2;) may then be
written as in (A.27) and (A.28). One readily veries that @GDP2 ()=@L2 = w2 = w(()) and
@GDP2 ()=@K2 = R2 = R(()).











































































As L;2 = K;2 = 0 holds in equilibrium and factor prices are strictly positive, I arrive at
@GDP2 ()=@qA
2 > 0 and @GDP2 ()=@qB
2 > 0.
In view of gA
 (2;) > 0 and gB
 (2;) < 0, the conclusion is that the eect of a declining labor
force on E () is a sum of two terms of opposite sign with E (K2;L2;A2;B2; = 0) = 0.
As to (5.4), I use the same reasoning as above to derive dgdp2=dL2 and dgdp2=dK2. Then, straight-
forward manipulations of the Taylor approximation of dgdp2() deliver (5.4). 
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5







to maximize lifetime utility (2.1) subject to c
y
t +st = wt and co
t+1 = stRt+1=. Writing the problem
like this uses the fact that an individual's assets at t + 1 are equal to st + (1   )st=. Moreover,
it incorporates the results of Yaari (1965) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) according to which
individuals without a bequest motive want to annuitize all their wealth.
Since preferences are homothetic, the Euler condition delivers co
t+1=c
y
t = h(Rt+1=), where h :
R++ ! R++ is a monotonically increasing function. Using co
t+1 = stRt+1= and the Euler equation






where s(Rt+1;;)  s(;h(Rt+1);Rt+1). Since the intertemporal elasticity of substitution











anticipating 0. Then, s1 = s(R(2);;0)w(). Since dst=d > 0, I deduce from
(3.8), that dt+1=d > 0. Hence, 2 > . Moreover, (3.9) delivers B2 < B.




anticipating no change in the eective discount factor. Then, s1 = s(R();;)w(),
hence 2 =  and B2 = B. The only change that occurs at t = 2 concerns
consumption of the old at t = 2. Since the insurance companies pay less, one has
co
t+1 = stRt+1=0. As generation 2 anticipates 0, I have 3 >  and B3 < B.
2. From (3.12) it follows that  = 0. A higher life expectancy increases the left-hand side
of (3.11). Hence, to satisfy this equation B must decrease. 
34B The Phase Diagram
B.1 The Phase-Diagram of Figure 3.1
I develop the phase diagram in the (Bt;t) { plane.
First, consider the locus t  t+1   t. From (3.8) it follows that




By assumption, the locus t = 0 is stable in the vicinity of the steady state. Then, from (A.17)
I have 	0 ()=	() > ~ w0 ()= ~ w(). Hence, for all pairs (Bt;t) satisfying (B.1) near (B;)
I have dBt=dt > 0.
Next, consider the locus Bt = 0. From (A.20) we have for Bt > 0
Bt = 0  f(Bt;t)jBt+1   Bt = 0g ,  = gB (t+1) = gB ( (t;Bt)): (B.2)
By (A.18), this locus is stable with monotonic convergence. Moreover, all pairs (t;Bt) > 0 that
satisfy (B.2) are implicitly given by
 =  (t;Bt): (B.3)
Implicit dierentiation of (B.3) reveals that dBt=dt =  
=
B < 0 for all pairs (t;Bt) > 0. The
sign follows since 
 > 0 and 
B > 0 from Lemma 1.
B.2 The Phase-Diagram of Figure 4.1
This section proves the rightward shift of the t = 0 { locus and the downward shift of the
Bt = 0 { locus in the neighborhood of the locally stable steady state (;B) in response to a
decline in the growth rate of the labor force.
For 0 6= , equation (3.8) may be written as








Bt ~ w0 (t)
	(t+1)
1 + 
1 + 0 < 1: (B.5)
The t = 0 { locus associated with 0 satises (B.4) for t = t+1. Then, changes in 0 such










From (B.5), the term in brackets is negative. Hence, given Bt and d0 < 0, (B.6) gives dt > 0.
As to the Bt = 0 { locus consider (B.3). In the neighborhood of (;B) I have dBt =
 
 (t;Bt)=
B (t;Bt)dt. Moreover, from (B.4), one nds dt = 	(t+1)=[Bt ~ w(t)(1 + )]d0,
given t+1. Upon combining these two dierentials, one readily veries that dBt < 0 for d0 < 0.
35C Three Numerical Examples
This appendix presents three calibration exercises. The focus is on the steady state and its stability
properties.
I make the following three assumptions:
Assumption 1 Per-period utility is logarithmic such that individual savings at t is st =  wt=(1+
).
Assumption 2 The production function of the nal good F is CES, i.e.,












where   > 0, 0 < " < 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between both inputs, and
0 <  < 1.




; with v0 > 0, v > 1. (C.2)
Calibration The examples were computed with mathematica. All notebooks are available upon
request.
I consider three environments parameterized by the elasticity of substitution: " = 1, " = :9, and
" = 2. Let a period represent 30 years. Then, I choose  = :55, a population growth rate  = :35,
and a depreciation rate of technological knowledge  = :26. These numbers correspond to per-
annum values of :98, :01, and :01, respectively. The depreciation rate of capital is set equal to
unity. The distribution parameter is equal to  = 2=3 such that the share of output that accrues
to the capital-intensive (labor-intensive) intermediate is 1=3 (2=3) if the elasticity of substitution
is unity. The parameters of the input requirement function are v0 = 1=2 and v = 2. Finally, I set
  = 2:1 with the implication, that the steady-state annual growth rate of per-capita variables is
1:8% if " = 1. This growth rate is approximately consistent with the trend growth rates of most
of today's industrialized countries.
Key Results For Three Examples.
Elasticity of Steady State steady-state growth average annual eigenvalues
Substitution (;B) rate g = gA ()    growth rate (1;2)
" = 1 (3:6776;14:2964) 0:71869 1:8% (0:778386;0:409777)
" = :9 (3:151871;12:451) 0:703 1:79% (0:711324;0:46547)
" = 2 (59:5637;150:124) 1:24951 2:7% (0:973239;0:343434)
Since both eigenvalues are strictly positive and smaller than unity, the steady state is a locally
stable node. Moreover, observe that the growth rates increase in the elasticity of substitution, a
nding consistent with the general results established in Irmen (2009).
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